Welcome to 2023 Tri-university Conference website!

Date:April 15th, 2023 (Saturday)
Time:8.30 am - 6.00 pm
Venue:Nanyang Executive Centre
Lecture Room 2 (Level 2, Education Wing)
60 Nanyang View 
Singapore 639673

 

 

Programme

TimeProgrammeDetails
8.30am - 9.00amRegistrationCoffee and Tea provided from 8.00am
9.05am - 9.10amWelcome AddressPresenter:
Prof Tan Hun Tong,
Nanyang Technological University
9.10am - 10.10amPaper 1 Do patent disclosures shape firm boundaries? Evidence from patent prosecution

Presenter:
Asst Prof In Gyun Baek,
National University of Singapore

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10.10am - 10.30amBreak 
10.30am - 11.30amPaper 2Bank taxes and voluntary disclosure: Evidence from state bank taxes

Presenter:
Asst Prof Shaphan Ng,
Singapore Management University

Abstract:
We examine the effects of bank taxes on the voluntary disclosure of borrower firms. We exploit variation in state-level bank tax rates to find that state bank taxes are positively associated with the number of management forecasts and 8-K disclosures of borrower firms. Turning to channels, we provide evidence that banks decrease syndicated lending to borrower firms following bank tax increases and that the effects of bank taxes on disclosure are increasing in borrowers’ lagged DealScan-based leverage and decreasing in the number of lagged lead banks that a borrower has, suggesting a financing mechanism. We also find evidence that disclosure effects are increasing in the number of covenants in the number of in-state v. out-of-state lenders, and decrease (increase) the bank allocations of in-state (out-of-state) lenders, suggesting a monitoring mechanism. Finally, we find evidence that 1) bank taxes decrease bank Tier 1 capital ratios and that 2) bank leverage and 3) the interaction between bank leverage and covenant violations increase the positive effects of bank taxes on borrower disclosure, suggesting a bank leverage mechanism. Our study provides novel evidence that bank taxation spills over onto borrower firms’ information environments through multiple channels.

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11.30am - 11.50amBreak 
11.50am - 12.50pmPaper 3The Effect of Discretionary Controls on Voluntary Employee Efforts in Nonprofit Organizations

Presenter:
Asst Prof Huaxiang Yin,
Nanyang Technological University

Abstract:
Prior research documents that controls can signal distrust and reduce voluntary employee efforts in settings where managers benefit directly from employee efforts. We develop theories to suggest that controls can signal managerial value congruence and increase voluntary employee efforts in settings where managers and employees collaborate to advance a social mission but do not directly benefit from their collaborative efforts. In these settings, we predict and find that employees are more likely to exert a high level of voluntary effort when managers impose a control that enforces a minimum level of employee effort than when managers do not impose such a control. In addition, the presence or absence of a control does not influence voluntary employee efforts when the manager does not have control discretion and a computer program randomly assigns the control. Process evidence confirms that the positive effect of discretionary controls is driven by perceived managerial value congruence. Because our setting is characteristic of many nonprofit organizations, our results suggest that controls imposed at managers’ discretion may increase voluntary employee efforts and lead to more effective collaboration between managers and employees in these organizations.

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12.50pm - 2.20pmLunch at Function Room 
2.20pm - 3.20pmPaper 4Monitoring and Tax Planning – Evidence from State-Owned Enterprise

Presenter:
Asst Prof David Samuel,
Singapore Management University

Abstract:
This study provides new evidence on the association of state ownership and tax planning by showing that a state owner’s monitoring incentives affect a firm’s tax planning. Using the setting of a developed market economy, Germany, we distinguish between state owners that directly benefit from state-owned enterprises’ (SOEs’) income tax payments and those that do not. Our results indicate that state ownership is not associated with less tax planning, unless the state owner directly benefits from higher tax payments. These results are robust to various specifications and suggest that shareholders’ monitoring incentives are a determinant of a firm’s tax planning activities.

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3.20pm - 3.40pmBreak 
3.40pm - 4.40pmPaper 5Borrower Correlated Liquidity Demands and the Use of Minimum Liquidity Covenants in Loan Contracts

Presenter:
Asst Prof Shushu Jiang,
National University of Singapore

Abstract:
Banks serve as important liquidity providers to the corporate sector. However, a bank’s ability to provide liquidity is limited if many of its borrowers demand liquidity at the same time (i.e., correlated liquidity demands). We predict and find that a bank is more likely to include covenants that require a borrower to hold minimum liquidity (minimum liquidity covenants) in loan contracts when the borrower has higher correlated liquidity demands with the bank’s loan portfolio. We further find that the effect of borrower-lender portfolio liquidity demand correlation on the use of minimum liquidity covenants is stronger when banks are more affected by the Liquidity Coverage Ratio regulations, when borrowers experience negative liquidity shocks, and when borrowers face greater financial constraints. Lastly, we find that borrowers have lower liquidity risks after obtaining loans with minimum liquidity covenants. Overall, our findings suggest that banks actively monitor their borrowers’ liquidity to ensure their role as liquidity providers.

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4.40pm - 5.00pmTea Break at Function Room 
5.00pm - 6.00pmPaper 6The value of reading people: Evidence from financial analysts

Presenter:
Asst Prof Yachang Zeng
Nanyang Technological University

Abstract:
According to classical attention literature, individuals’ selection of communication content in written outputs reflects their selective attention toward people. Accordingly, we measure analysts’ attentional processes and interests in people (namely, person orientation) by quantifying their tendency to refer to individuals in research reports. We find that person-oriented analysts outperform non-person-orientated analysts regarding All-Star status, earnings forecasts accuracy, and forecast error consistency. More interestingly, the long-term returns generated by personoriented analysts’ recommendation-based portfolios are greater at 41-53 basis points than by nonperson-oriented analysts’. However, there is no such difference for the short-term returns. Likewise, our market reaction test suggests that investors do not immediately recognize personoriented analysts’ superior quantified research outputs. We further find that person-oriented analysts ask more people-related questions (including those on management turnover) but fewer financial questions than non-person-oriented analysts. The former analysts are also more likely to comment on management turnover in research reports and become early commentators than the latter analysts. Our supplementary analyses further suggest that our findings are more likely driven by person-oriented analysts’ superior abilities in acquiring and processing person-related information rather than their better information access. Our study suggests that person-oriented analysts can effectively process people-related information into quantified research outputs.

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6.30pmDinner at Captain's Table Chinese Restaurant at Raffles Marina