Managing undersea cable disruption in Africa

By Rafiq Raji

Photo source: Ship Nerd News

An anchor drag severed three undersea cables that feed Africa in February 2024, and only weeks later in mid-March, an underwater avalanche off the coast of Cote d’Ivoire caused damage to another four cables; namely: ACE, MainOne, South Atlantic 3 and WACS.^[1],[2] In about mid-May 2024, the East African countries of Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda, similarly experienced internet disruptions owing to damage to submarine cables feeding them, specifically the SEACOM and EASSy undersea cables, which were damaged off the coast of South Africa.^[3],[4] There is little to suggest if any of this was an act of sabotage but as the great power competition between the US/West and China/Russia gathers steam the risk to African undersea cable communications infrastructure from sabotage increases.^[5] This is forcing African governments to seek multilateral and international safeguards. Localisation of digital traffic, investment in new cables, as well as satellite backups could be key to ensuring resilience. 

African governments are seeking for international laws and frameworks to be strengthened to protect undersea cables.^[6],[7] The near total dependence on undersea cable for transferring high speed data has made the global undersea cable communications infrastructure (GUCCI) strategically important. It has also made it vulnerable to interruptions caused by cuts – accidental or otherwise.^[8],[9],[10] Fixing undersea cables is an expensive and often arduous proposition. And in a highly politicised geopolitical environment the security imperative for global undersea cables has become exigent.^{[11],[12],[13]}

A series of undersea cable cuts in the Baltic Sea in mid-November 2024 led to the West accusing Russia and China of sabotage and forming a coalition to protect GUCCI.^{[14],[15],[16],[17]}  Moscow dismissed the accusations as “ridiculous” and instead insinuated Ukraine for the action. Beijing, whose ship Yi Peng 3 was in the vicinity when another cable cut occurred also rejected accusations of sabotage and expressed willingness to cooperate with Swedish authorities to investigate the incident.

In early January 2025, for instance, Taiwan accused a Chinese ship of damaging a submarine cable owned by Chunghwa Telecom, a local carrier.^[18] Even so, it is still inconclusive about whether China or Russia have been sabotaging undersea cables, as the evidence acquired thus far remain circumstantial. In Feb 2025 Norway released a Russian-crewed Norwegian vessel after finding no evidence linking it to the damage to an undersea fibre optic cable connecting Latvia and Sweden – thus cooling down tensions that had been raised in the aftermath of the 2024 cable cut incidents. The Washington Post, citing Western intelligence sources, later reported that the damage to Baltic Sea infrastructure likely stemmed from maritime accidents involving poorly maintained ships and inexperienced crews rather than deliberate sabotage.

The Western alliance has started to take steps to protect its undersea infrastructure. NATO has launched a mission dubbed “Baltic Sentry” to enhance surveillance and protection of critical undersea infrastructure in the area and address concerns about possible sabotage. The United States has commenced a review of the vulnerabilities of global undersea communications infrastructure.^{[19],[20],[21]} It has also been building alliances in Asia that exclude China. The Quad partnership which includes Australia, India and Japan, for instance, pools information, capabilities and standards to guard undersea cable infrastructure. It has also taken measures that appear to be aimed at preventing China from being able to spy on West-bound internet traffic.^[22] In the case of Vietnam, which is planning one of the biggest cable expansions in Asia currently, the U.S. is actively trying to persuade it from using Chinese contractors to construct them.^[23]

Meanwhile, China is beginning to push back against Western efforts to block its firms from undersea cable contracts.^[24],[25] Chinese researchers allege the United States regularly conducts false flag cyber-attacks and espionage operations that defame China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran, findings which Chinese authorities appear to endorse.^[26],[27] They point fingers, instead, at the US which has a history of undermining the critical infrastructure of those it considers its adversaries.^{[28],[29],[30],[31],[32]}  

That global undersea cables were always vulnerable to cuts and sabotage. What has changed is that the enlightened self-interest that maintained an informal consensus that protected digital infrastructure as a public good. The “New York Principles on Undersea Cables” put together by the United States on the sidelines of the United Nations General Assembly in September 2024 proved ineffective as China and Russia were excluded.^{[33],[34],[35],[36],[37]} Consequently, the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) and the International Cable Protection Committee (ICPC) established the International Advisory Body for Submarine Cable Resilience in November 2024, with its inaugural co-chair awarded to the Nigerian minister of communications and digital economy, which highlights the importance African countries are now placing on the security of undersea communications cables.^[38] The Submarine Cable Resilience Summit scheduled for February 2025 in Abuja, Nigeria, will be its first in-person meeting.

Africa risks being caught in the crossfire of the great power competition fuelling fears about GUCCI vulnerabilities, as its digital infrastructure is becoming predominantly Chinese-made.^[39] African internet infrastructure is not exactly resilient. Unlike Asia, African high speed data is carried over relatively few interconnected undersea cable and does not have the kind of redundancies built in that can withstand severe cuts. Cable cuts, whether by sabotage or accident, could have a debilitating economic effects.^[40] The protection of African digital infrastructure is largely dependent on the goodwill of a global coalition. Since African countries cannot really afford to choose sides, as cheaper and increasingly reliable Chinese-made and Chinese-financed digital infrastructure has helped bridged their respective digital divides, and Western dominance of the global Tech ecosystem remains unassailable, they must be on the vanguard for a coming to terms of world powers for sustainable solutions, as available military options are not particularly fool-proof. That said, undersea cables are more likely to be damaged from anchors of ships, industrial fishing equipment, and seismic incidents than sabotage, as were the case in the 2024 African cable cuts.^[41] African cables could potentially be sabotaged by shipping and/or terrorist groups, especially those operating around the Horn of Africa, where seaborne terrorism and piracy are the norm.^[42]

Strategic Asset

African governments should designate internet infrastructure as strategic asset and thus extend as much protection as they possibly can. Protection of the internet infrastructure will also require continental harmonisation of rules covering construction, maintenance and upgrades which will reduce operation costs for service providers.^[43] The African Charter on Maritime Security and Safety and Development in Africa (“The Lome Charter”) is an existing framework that can be used to establish joint marine patrols. Although the implementation of the African Integrated Maritime Strategy 2050 is still pending, the recommendation of the 5^th Sea Power for Africa Symposium (SPAS) to establish a maritime sub-committee at the African Union could have an immediate mandate to coordinate a joint African naval alliance (an “African NATO”) to secure the continent’s undersea cables.^[44] This could be formalised at the 6^th SPAS scheduled for May 2026 in Abuja, Nigeria.  

Localisation of traffic and investment in new cables necessary for resilience

Plugging into as many cables as possible to increase redundancy is perhaps the most robust risk mitigant, as is directing more connections towards terrestrial networks.^[45] Building and maintaining undersea cables are expensive, leaving African governments at the mercy of Big Tech firms, which are increasingly the major investors in new cables. ^[46],[47] For example, the 45,000km 2Africa undersea cable - the world’s longest-  landed on West African shores in early 2024. It is managed by Meta, the global social media giant that owns Facebook and Instagram, atop a consortium that includes telecommunications companies from China, South Africa, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt, as well as the West Indian Ocean Cable Company.^[xlviii]

With the global submarine cable market expected to more than double in size - from US$12.6bn in 2022 to US$30.5bn by 2030 . Big Tech is not taking any chances.^[40],[50] Meta is building an end-to-end around-the-world cable of its own, which has been designed to avoid troubled waters. It is to be situated far away from real and potential conflict hotspots around the world.^[51] But even Big Tech must abide by international and local laws, and they are usually willing to do so. Thus, African digital sovereignty need not be sacrificed at the altar of need for foreign capital and expertise. Despite the huge costs, many African countries, including the very poor ones like The Gambia and Guinea, are looking to invest in building fibre optic networks -often with the help from international development partners to finance them.^[52],[53] African telcos, such as Safaricom are also beginning to consider building their own undersea cables, or invest in new ones.^[54]  

Satellites as viable backup option

Satellites are the main competitor to undersea cables. But  they cannot entirely replace fibre optic cables. Satellites networks are expensive to deploy and they have relatively limited bandwidth. However, advances in the field could see satellite technology compete favourably with cables in decades to come. While satellites are expensive substitutes, they remain perhaps the most reliable backup infrastructure to undersea cables. Western security alliance - NATO - has greenlit a system that will use satellites as a source of redundancy in the event of outages from submarine cable cuts and divert traffic to satellites in the event undersea cables are cut.^[55] Some 17 countries have more than 60 satellites in orbit, with many more planned the years to come. But most of these satellites have been procured from foreign suppliers. While these satellites provide vital telecommunication services they can also be used for surveillance by spy agencies and big businesses.^{[56],[57],[58]} The geopolitical forces of great power competition between the West and China could play out in the African satellite market. For now, China appears to have the upper hand. Chinese satellites are cheaper and much of African digital infrastructure is built on Chinese switches.^[59],[60] But with a new assertive administration under Donald Trump in the White House pressure is likely to mount on Africa to make way for the likes of Starlink. It is already live in 19 African countries and there is a push by the US administration to persuade other African countries to let the firm operate without restrictions. This has raised alarm – not least because Starlink is owned by tech billionaire Elon Musk who is a close associate of President Donald Trump. This effectively makes him a politically exposed personality. Critics fear giving free access to Starlink could come at the cost of sovereignty and could even pose a serious security threat – one that is no less ominous as the one that relies on Chinese hardware.

If African governments integrate their satellite resources, however, they could successfully mitigate total communication shutdowns and retain sovereign autonomy over digital data and assets. But this will require cooperation and a long term pan-African agency, perhaps under the aegis of the African Space Agency scheduled to be launched by the African Union Commission in 2025.^[61] In the short to medium term, African telecommunication firms looking to add redundancies to their systems outside undersea cables in the event of emergencies could simply procure satellite services from international satellite service providers. As these business-to-government (B2G) and business-to-business (B2B) arrangements would still be relatively expensive and not easily scalable, business-to-consumer (B2C) broadband satellite services are a necessity, as economies of scale allow them to be provided relatively cheaply, although they will still not compare favourably with far much cheaper cable-powered services.

(with additional inputs from Centre Director Amit Jain)